Abstract-Contacts are essential to guarantee the performance of opportunistic networks, but due to resource constraints, some nodes may not cooperate. In reputation systems, the perception of an agent depends on past observations to classify its actual behavior. Few studies have investigated the effectiveness of robust learning models for classifying selfish nodes in opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose a distributed reputation algorithm based on the game theory to achieve reliable information dissemination in opportunistic networks. A contact is modeled as a game, and the nodes can cooperate or not. By using statistical inference methods, we derive the reputation of a node based on learning from past observations. We applied the proposed algorithm to a set of traces to obtain a distributed forecasting base for future action when selfish nodes are involved in the communication. We evaluate the conditions in which the accuracy of data collection becomes reliable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile opportunistic networks are characterized by the lack of persistent connectivity, long delays, and low frequent encounters between the nodes. Contacts between pairs of nodes are the main alternative for the propagation of messages across the network, each network node acting as an intermediary for carrying copies of messages in an end-to-end communication.
Due to the absence of a fixed infrastructure, the interconnection between nodes exhibits high data loss rate and long delays. The communication between pair of the nodes occurs opportunistically when one node is within the transmission range of each other. The message is passed in bundles instead of packets, and the receiving node carries the message and eventually forwards it opportunistically. The communication occurs in a decentralized manner, based on individual decisions that contribute to the message dissemination across the network. Since there is no central arbitration with respect to the transfer, one can not assume that the cooperation of other users will always occur. Due to resource constraints some nodes may avoid cooperating with the communication, acting selfishly during the forwarding activity.
From a social point of view, during a contact the user can either contribute to the common good and to cooperate with the communication or can act selfishly and take advantage of the network users to transfer its own data. This behavior is defined in economic theory as the free-rider problem [1] , i.e., the selfish node requests transfer of its data, but avoids passing on data from other nodes. The traffic only occurs through the collaborative users, decrementing the number of possible opportunistic routes, as well as the individual and overall system performance. Intuitively, a contact is associated with the cost in terms of resource utilization to forward incoming messages, and with the benefit associated with the cooperation of other nodes. When the benefits are not greater than the costs to forward the data, there is no explicit incentive for cooperation.
Some studies have shown that the presence of the selfish behavior on a portion of the network nodes degrades considerably the individual and overall system performance when compared to the scenario where every node cooperates [2] [3], [4] . The degradation occurs as a consequence of the reduction of the possible routes, causing a constant traffic break, raising the maximum resource utilization of the cooperative nodes. As a result, the cost for cooperation during the communication increases. Based on this fact, the identification of selfish behavior and the selection of proper mechanisms to deal with are fundamental to the implementation of opportunistic mobile networks.
Some approaches to create mechanisms to encourage cooperation have been studied in the literature. In general, these approaches can be a stimulus or inhibition. Incentive schemes [5] [6] use credit methods to induce users to cooperate with the data transfer; therefore, the network services are only available for users who have good credit. However, in opportunistic networks the mobility generates different contact patterns among users, which makes the credit system biased, for example, to users with higher popularity. Thus, the credit may not always reflect the actual credibility of a node, making difficult the implementation of the system in real environments. On the other hand, the approaches based on inhibition, use mechanisms to detect selfish users, excluding them from the network until they change their behavior [7] . In this approach, it is common the existence of a reputation system that measures the reliability of a node collaboration from the point of view of their neighbors, reducing the reliability under evidence of
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978-1-4799-6606-6/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE non-cooperation, or increasing the reliability otherwise. This paper presents a novel reputation mechanism based on building a new model of trust among the network users. We introduce a clustering approach to classify the nodes into classes according to their respective reputation values. Unlike other studies in the literature, we use a new way of providing a reputation system that is consistent with the social patterns present in opportunistic networks based on the user contacts. The proposed mechanism reflects the degree of selfishness and cooperation in the social field. Just as two users have different degrees of social relationships, they may have different degrees of selfishness with the rest of the population, and our model aims to capture this possibility by using the clustering technique to separate them accurately.
For this purpose, we assume that the contact is an opportunity for decision-making, in which each node has to take actions (cooperate or not cooperate), and each action is performed with a probability of the node to be or not to be selfish. We evaluate this mechanism through a robust scheme to make the overall learning process by aggregating data from different users for further dissemination of informations about the selfish nodes in the network. This way, the information also comes from other users, decreasing the time for effective learning. Subsequently, we apply our formulation to a simulation driven by contact traces taken from a real environment to estimate the effectiveness of the learning process.
II. RELATED WORKS
Opportunistic networks operate independently of a central authority. The nodes exchange messages with each other to provide connectivity. A node is said to be selfish when it refuses to forward data from other nodes due to resource constraints such as energy or buffer space. Thus, recognition of selfish behavior is crucial for modeling protocols that can deal with misbehavior. Some papers in the literature address the classification of selfish nodes proposing methods for ensuring future cooperation between the network nodes by means of reaction methods to selfish behavior as punishment [4] or incentives [8] . In some cases, however, because of inherent features of opportunistic networks, to ensure a positive review for a selfish node becomes a difficult task.
Some mechanisms found in the literature propose to detect selfish behavior using detection system like watchdog [4] , [9] , [10] and the "catch" [11] protocol. Basically, in these systems nodes include a module aiming to discover the misbehaving nodes. To address this problem, the nodes overhear the wireless channel in order to analyze the traffic to identify misbehaving trend. However, due to the noisy channel, the node mobility and the lack of connectivity, the detection accuracy is not always guaranteed, producing a rate of incorrect detections. The detection system can classify as selfish a node that indeed is selfish (true positive -TP), not selfish a node that is selfish (false positive -FP), selfish a node that is not selfish (false negative -FN), or can classify as not selfish a node that is indeed not selfish (true negative -TN).
TP and TN indicate correct detections, while FP and FN represent wrong detections. Due to inaccuracy of detection, reputation systems have emerged as an alternative to the measurement of the cooperation level of a node. In a reputation system, each node observes the behavior of its neighbors and builds a table with the reputation values. A low-reputation value means that the neighbor node probably has a selfish behavior while a high-reputation value represents a cooperative behavior. The assumption made by reputation systems are that it is more accurate to classify an agent about its behavior when the number of observations about it increases.
Marti et al. [4] proposed a reputation model where the detection system (watchdog) uses a threshold value θ to determine the misbehavior of a particular node. However, aspects such as transmission power, collision and high delays are bottlenecks for watchdogs. To minimize the magnitude of false positives and false negatives on detection, they proposed a mechanism of reputation called pathrater, that maintains the reputation of each node, excluding from the routing the nodes that reach a very low reputation threshold. The pathrater keeps the ratings for other nodes to perform the node selection for routing data. Therefore, the packets are carried by the nodes with the highest reputation in the path. The reputation of nodes is based on a watchdog system; it increases periodically while a path is active and decreases when a connection is broken.
Bansal et al. [12] proposed a reputation system in which the penalty imposed to nodes detected as selfish is -2, while the benefit applied to not selfish nodes is +1. Every node starts with a reputation equals to zero and when its value exceeds a certain threshold, this node is put on a faulty list. The goal is to impose a lenient punishment to nodes detected as selfish. To give a second chance, the nodes are removed from the faulty list after a certain timeout t. However, this removal is made without any criterion as a change at the behavior of the selfish nodes is detected. Thus, this method fails on punishing or incentivizing the selfish nodes in an appropriate way.
Buchegger and Le Boudec [2] proposed CONFIDANT, a protocol that has an integrated mechanism that updates the reputation of a node when the evidences of selfish behavior exceed a particular threshold value. Additionally, they inserted a collaborative model for cooperation among the nodes. The rating is calculated by a function that assigns weights to own detections (higher weight) and information from neighbors (less weight).
In [13] , the CONFIDANT reputation mechanism uses a Bayesian filter to predict future behaviors after counting the positives and negatives related to the network nodes. The authors define a Beta distribution function to indicate the level of cooperation of a particular network node from its positives and negatives. Similarly, Li and Das [14] periodically decrement the reputation of the nodes not observed during a time interval using Bayesian filter.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We define a network as a set of N mobile nodes and S selfish nodes. Initially, all the nodes have the same reputation, and no information about the network. All the nodes have a common technique to detect selfish behavior by operating in a promiscuous mode and listening to every bundle transmitted by its neighbors. Figure 1 shows the scheme implemented at every network node. It has three main components acting with the network interface. The first one is the detection scheme, responsible for monitoring the data traffic searching for nodes with selfish behavior. The second one is the reputation system, which measures the cooperative level of its neighbors, and the third one is the classification algorithm used to perform a classification of nodes into selfish or not selfish based on its reputation.
A. Network Model
We assume that the nodes can be selfish, but they are not malicious, that is, they do not send false information over the network. Based on this premise, the network is modeled as an arbitrary graph G = (N, E), with N nodes, E edges and S selfish nodes. We assume that every node has a detection mechanism like a watchdog. Since the detection system is not addressed in depth here, we assume that the detection method operates with a probability of correct detection P e of successfully detecting the behavior of a node. We can vary the efficiency of the detection method with respect to detection errors on these systems. We also assume that the network nodes operate in a broadcast mode in such a way that the information about the knowledge of a network node can be disseminated among all nodes, and these nodes do not attempt to cheat the network with false informations.
B. Reputation Model
The reputation system executed by each node is an extension of the components presented in [2] . Each unselfish node carries a monitoring module to assess the behavior of neighbor nodes in the network. By each contact, some assessment is performed despite a node is selfish or not selfish. Thus, a node A can get information from a neighbor B when one of the following situations occurs:
Selfish Contact
Node A, using its monitoring mechanism during a contact, detects that neighbor node B is selfish. However, since monitoring errors can occur, we model this fact by using the probability of correct detection P e .
Not Selfish Contact
Both nodes A and B are not selfish. So they may share information about individual probes to feed the distributed reliable system. Similarly, the not selfish contact can be erroneously detected as selfish depending on the effectiveness of the detection system. Again this is modelled by the probability of correct detection P e .
Even for the collaborative nodes the reputation can be discriminating because of the social process associated with opportunistic networks. Collaborative nodes with stronger social bond will have higher reputation than collaborative nodes with weaker social ties. To address this variation of the problem, we use a variant of the sigmoid function [15] , a mathematical strategy commonly applied in the literature on learning systems, neural networks, among others. The sigmoidal functions are able to assess the probability of occurring an event based on the experience observed in the system. When the network is started, the cooperation probability is equal for all the nodes, but as the observations related to cooperation are collected from the network, these values are adjusted until cooperation probability reaches a value with little variability.
At some point in time, the amount of observations of the behavior of the neighbor nodes is sufficient to accurately understand a particular state of the system. The understanding of the systems becomes reliable even under small variations in the observations. These variations can raise from communication errors, as well as from failures by the detection system. We apply this function to the reputation model from new observations collected from the network, until the moment, the ranking can be considered reliable, with little risk of false negatives or false positives.
Since in opportunistic networks the total number of nodes is unknown, the scalability has to be considered, as well as the variation of the cooperation level due to reaction methods as methods of punishment/incentive. Thus, we discuss methods of further reaction with no major disruption in the reputation data. Another remarkable feature of these functions is the display of learning curves that can be used to predict the future behavior. This is a valuable function as we can predict selfish nodes with more accuracy and less information. This way, we analyze the probability of a node u to be more cooperative than v as a decision process defined by Eq. (1):
where P cooperation (u, v) represents the probability of u to be more cooperative than v, R k is the reputation of node k ∈ N and F d a significance factor to stress the difference between the reputations of the pair (u, v). This factor represents how much cooperative (or selfish) a node is compared to other nodes based on their reputations. We used this to design a new method to reputation update process where the new reputation assigns more weight to most observed nodes.
We define the update process as a two-step process for each pair of contact (u, v): check of node v behavior and update of the node v reputation. The initial reputation for all neighbors is always 0, and the reputation value is in the interval (−1, 1) . The closer the reputation is to 1 then, the node is probably not selfish, the node is probably selfish otherwise. The process of updating reputation works as follows:
Average reputation
At every contact, the node calculates its average reputation by Eq. 2, the arithmetic mean of the reputation of the neighbors at the moment of contact with node v.
Node update The individual update of a node, when there is a positive for selfish node, is computed through Eq. 3, where D(v) ∈ {0, 1} assumes 0 when v is detected as selfish and 1 otherwise. δ is the weight assigned to each new observation.
By using this reputation model, each node can infer the behavior of a neighbor node based on its reputation value. Therefore, we introduced a verification algorithm which allows the classification of the behavior of a neighbor node after by collecting a number of observations. For this purpose, we use a clustering algorithm to choose from which moment on the available samples are enough to distinguish the reputations of selfish nodes and not selfish nodes.
C. Classification Model
Reputation systems perform sampling of the behavior of the network nodes based on the collected observations from the network. Although the use of threshold is a widely adopted alternative in the literature, it may not accurately reflect the actual state of the network behavior. The first difficulty is the choice of the threshold value. High values may indicate low reliability though the convergence rate to this value is high. On the other hand, low values can indicate low reliability but with shorter convergence rate. In the latter case, however, the detection system may be vulnerable to sample errors, yielding low values of reputation. Since in opportunistic networks the contact distribution function does not follow an uniform trend [16] , the reputation values may converge at different rates for each network node. Because the contact of a selfish node can be more frequent inside a group of nodes than others, nodes with more contacts with selfish nodes will be updated more frequently.
Our proposal includes a classification model-based clustering technique, which aims at separating the information already collected from the network into groups of users suspected of selfish behavior and not suspected of selfish behavior. The main advantage of this method is the ability to learn from the collected information besides fulfilling when necessary. Reputation systems can be used as a more accurate model to predict the behavior of a neighbor given its reputation. Basically, a node can classify its neighbor behavior as selfish or not selfish based on reputation values generated by the reputation scheme. However, reputation is a relative measure from the point of view of the nodes, and can not be classified a priori since the initial state of the network knowledge about the misbehavior of any node is unknown. Thus, the ability of learning is an essential component that makes the reputation model intelligent.
Some works in the literature utilize a threshold to assess a suspicious node as selfish. However, in opportunistic mobile networks this value may be subject to the distribution function of human contacts in these networks. To avoid this issue and to be able to perform a classification without relying on network parameters, we used the technique of unsupervised learning, where the initial state of agents is unknow. This is an attempt to find a way to classify nodes into clusters based on their reputation. Thus. each node can classify a suspect node whose characteristics vary greatly from one group of users with higher reputation.
Clustering techniques have been previously applied to build models of network behavior based on the nodes [17] . Grouping or clustering is the method of grouping objects into meaningful subclasses so that the members from the same cluster are quite similar. and the members from different clusters are quite different from each other [18] . Thus, clustering schemes are useful for classifying misbehavior based on reputation values.
We choose a partitioning algorithm for clustering data. This type of algorithm constructs a partition of the objects in a set of K clusters. Particularly, we used the k-means algorithm for construct these clusters. K-means takes into account which instances (the reputations of nodes) are represented on a euclidean space. Initially, each instance is assigned as a cluster of size equals to one. The iterative approach of this method puts each instance in one of the K clusters whose mean yields the least within cluster sum of squares. Since the sum of squares is the squared euclidean distance, so, each instance is assigned as the nearest cluster, i.e., the most similar class based on its attributes, in this case these attributes are the reputation values for neighbor nodes. At the end of iterations, the centroid values are returned by this algorithm. In this work, we used K = 2, whose first class covers the selfish nodes and the second class covers the cooperative nodes.
To evaluate the performance of the k-means algorithm applied to our model, we used the Silhouette coefficient to interpret and validate the clustered data [19] . In this method, the clustering efficiency is measured by the ratio of cohesion to dispersion of data within a class compared to other classes. Optimal values of this ratio are close to 1. We also evaluate the accuracy of clustering, analyzing the true positive rate (selfish nodes classified as selfish nodes) and the true negative rate (not selfish nodes classified as not selfish) given by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), respectively. In this case, we consider that true positive rate is the accuracy for classification of the selfish nodes in a cluster containing nodes with selfish features and a true negative rate for the second cluster.
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We designed and implemented a trace-driven discrete event simulator written in C++. A trace file was obtained from measurements taken on real-world occurrences of pairs of contacts between devices carried by humans occurring in a given time interval. The trace is a set of a 4-tuple < t i , N a , N b , d i >, 1 ≤ i ≤ |T |, with |T | represents the number of instances of trace T and d i a contact duration in the i-th instance. A contact is a chance for transmission between a pair of nodes (N a , N b ) .
The simulator takes as input the number of nodes N , the number of selfish nodes S, the probability of correct detection P e . The contact trace used was the Reality Mining [20] , experimentally conducted at MIT in a period of 246 days, with 97 samples. Three contact traces were collected based on the MIT user habits, with a duration of 24, 48, and 72 hours respectively.
Since contacts are not uniformly distributed, we had to choose the selfish nodes randomly by using only the portion of nodes with the strongest social ties in the network. We did this in order to avoid large variation in the resulting samples since we found out that selfish nodes with weaker social ties are more difficult to be observed. To accomplish this, we calculated the popularity based on the concept of freeman centrality [21] , that is, how popular is a network node based on the number of contacts made with it.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our model with different values of probability of correct detection P e to study the behavior of the reputation system and the clustering algorithm for correctly classifying the nodes.
A. Results
In order to evaluate the robustness and efficiency of the proposed reputation model, we carried a set of experiments. First, we analyzed the silhouette coefficient to verify the cohesion and dispersion of the reputation values in each cluster. Second, we analyzed the rate of true positives and rate of true negatives for each class. The tests were executed for increasing probability detection. Table I shows the results for contact traces with a duration of 24, 48, and 72 hours.
We realized that, when the probability of correct detection P e was 75%, the silhouette coefficient took on the values 0.70, 0.71, and 0.74, for contact traces with a duration of 24, 48, and 72 hours, respectively. Values in the range [0. 7, 1] indicate that the samples are well separated, even when the detection error rate is about 25%. However, this error rate affects the dispersion of the reputation values, and these dispersion values converge slowly to 1 or -1, depending on the evaluated node is selfish or not selfish.
In the third experiment, we evaluated how the silhouette coefficient varies as the probability of correct detection P e increases from 75% to 95%. For a 24-hours contact trace, the silhouette coefficient increased from 0.70 to 0.76, with a corresponding detection error rate of 25% and 5%, respectively, a slight increase of 8.5%. For a 48-hours contact trace, the silhouette coefficient raised from 0.71 to 0.78, an increase of 9.8%. We also noticed a slight increase of 10.2% for a 72-hours contact trace, with a maximum silhouette value of 0.82. This small improvement of the silhouette coefficient can be attributed to the underlying assumption that social patterns become more evident as more observations are collected, making easier the classification process. However, if a node is not a neighbor, this is not rated or it is more difficult to classify. Moreover, the detection error rate is lower, becoming less difficult to classify the node behavior because the reputation values in both classes are well separated from each other.
In order to verify whether the rate of correct classification is reliable, we evaluated the true positive (TPR) and true negative (TNR) rates. Unlike the silhouette coefficient, improvements of TPR and TNR were much larger. Using the 72-hour contact trace, and P e = 0.95, the maximum value of 99.6% for TPR and 99.7% for TNR were achieved with 5% of detection error, and a minimum of 89.7% for TPR and 92.8% for TNS with detection error of 25%. The classification reached 95% or more of correct judgment when the probability of the correct judgement by the detection system was greater than or equal to 85%. When the 72-hour contact trace was used, the correct classification rate was always higher than 95% together with any probability of correct detection.
Thus, even under a low index of dispersed reputations indicated by the silhouette coefficient, as in the case of P e = 0.75, the hit rate is greater than 89% in any one of the collected traces we used. This occurs due to the daily communication pattern between the nodes. The sporadic contact between nodes with weak social relationship yields less information about their behavior to be delivered to other nodes. Therefore, their reputation will remain close to the initial value, making it difficult to find out their actual behavior. On the other hand, contacts between nodes with stronger social bonds yield a larger number of observations of their behavior, and their reputations are closest to the values that indicate selfishness and not selfishness. Therefore, a node will hardly classify with accuracy node with which it has weak social relationship.
The strength of the social relationship defines how operate the major algorithms to opportunistic networks. Thus, it is necessary that a node classify more accurately the behavior of a neighbor with strong social ties. Although sporadic contacts between nodes with weak social relationship eventually occurs, they impose difficulties to the classification algorithm due to the low number of available observations but do not affect the overall performance of the model through the TPR and TNR hit rates.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a new reputation model that uses unsupervised machine learning techniques. We described the general characteristics of the proposed model, and carried out its evaluation using real contact traces and by varying P e , the probability of correct detection, which reflects how reliable it is to generate true positive or true negative.
We have tested this model by observing an opportunistic network during 24, 48, and 72 hours, and by classifying the nodes as selfish or not selfish. We evaluated the reliability of our model avoiding the use of thresholds for twofold: thresholds are difficult to be set under conditions of variable reliability of the detection system, and the contacts between the nodes does not follow a normal distribution. Thus, even under scattered reputation data arising from periodic contacts present in opportunistic networks, we have showed that the use of unsupervised method can ensure an excellent robustness in the classification of selfish nodes in opportunistic networks with more than 95% of accuracy for probability of correct detection P e ≥ 80%, after observing the network during at least 48 hours. When the probability of correct detection was P e = 75%, the accuracy rates for correctly classifying selfish nodes was 93% on average, and the accuracy for correctly classifying not selfish nodes was 95% on average.
As a future work, we intend to demonstrate the robustness of this model implementing the detection, reputation and classification components, and evaluating them with consolidated tools as The ONE, OMNeT++ or ns-2. Evaluate this model under different implementations of detection systems such as watchdogs or "catch" also deserves more attention. Finally, we plan to test the node classification by using other mechanisms such as inserting a third class to nodes which are difficult to be classified due to sporadic contacts or error rate of the detection system. These nodes will remain under observation until they can be classified in some way.
